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ioral choice model has not fared so well; alOf cognitive theories of motivation, the
though
most intensively researched in recent years
is it moderately predicts self-ratings of job
effort, its efficiency in predicting criteria measthe Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy (VIE)
theory. A recent review of VIE researchured
(9) by other than self-ratings is questionable.
shows the valence model to be reasonably When
pre- the behavioral choice model is used in
research, the following findings are typical:
dictive of occupational preference, job satisfaction, and valence of performance. The behav-1. Intrinsic outcomes (feelings of accomBronston T. Mayes (Ph.D. candidate - University of Califor- plishment, etc.) are better predictors of
nia, Irvine) is Assistant Professor of Management at the Uni1 Portions of this note were presented as a paper at the 17th
versity of Nebraska.
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FIGURE 1. The Temporal Dimension.

satisfaction and performance than are
extrinsic outcomes (pay, promotions,
etc.).
2. Small variances are obtained in valence

Surprisingly expectancy theorists have overlooked such an important variable in shaping be-

havior.

Even though some writers (4, 5, 7, 12, 15, 16)

have recognized the utility of considering the
measures; thus, multiplying expectancy
impact of time lag effects on motivation, no one
by valence does not increase predicta-

bility over use of expectancy alone.

3. Causal tests using time series designs
are inconclusive.

In addition to a number of methodological
problems, these findings led Mitchell (9) to suggest development of more accurate theoretical
representations and better construct measures.
The Forgotten Variable

Behavioralists have long recognized the importance of the performance-reward time lag in

administration of rewards and punishments to

influence behavior. The notion is that the more

immediate the consequence of a behavior, the
more likely the behavior will be reinforced.
Opsahl and Dunnette (10) state that one of the
most important variables in determining the effectiveness of money as a reinforcer is the schedule by which it is administered.

has attempted to incorporate this variable into a
VIE formulation. The purpose of this article is to

present a reformulation of the VIE behavioral

choice model that accounts for time-lag effects.

The Temporal Dimension
Obviously the VIE components (motive,
force, effort, task goal performance, and outcome attainment) occur sequentially. Figure 1
represents this temporal relationship. Some motive force precedes effort which, in turn, leads to

some level of task goal performance. When outcomes are contingent upon performance, they
will accrue to the individual after performance
is demonstrated, but experience and intuition
lead us to believe that these outcomes could be

staggered in their receipt.
In Figure 1, 01 and 02 are intrinsic outcomes

which are experienced immediately upon performance of a task. There is no perceptible time
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Where: Vt - Valence of an outcome to be received at ti
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d = Discount rate applicable to outcome.
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FIGURE 2. Hypothesized Effect of Time Lag o
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effort and attainment of an outcome
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Even individuals
who have not borrowed
esized to have some impact effect.
on the
motivational
money are aware that the purchasing power of
force to expend effort.
the dollar has declined steadily over the past 10
years.
The Relationship of Time to Valence

The influence of time on the attractiveness

non-monetary
has not yet been deAccording to Vroom (14), of
valence
is incentives
the antermined
empirically.
But it is intuitively appealticipated satisfaction derived
from
an outcome
ingfrom
to assumethe
that individuals
would prefer a
and should be distinguished
value of
promotion
rather
than next month and
an outcome, which is the amount
of today
actual
satisfaction derived from its attainment.
immediate praise Whether
from a supervisor rather than
one considers valence as a value or an anticipraise at some later date. The distinction bepated satisfaction, clearly outcomes may possess tween intrinsic and extrinsic rewards can be explained to some degree by the time lapse bediffering valences, and individuals are capable of
establishing preferences for outcomes based on tween performance and reward. The finding that
these differences in valence. VIE theorists have

intrinsic rewards are better predictors of satisfac-

not considered adequately the possible relation-

tion and performance (9) may rest on the time

ship of time to attractiveness of outcomes.

differential of their receipt.
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If perceptions of valence are related to the
effort-reward time lag, what is the mathematical

nature of this relationship? People seem to perceive present time units as being longer in dura-

tion than time units associated with past events
(11). If future time units are assumed to be col-

lapsed by individuals in a manner similar to past
time units and if outcomes are assumed to retain
some valence no matter how distant their at-

tainment, an exponential function might be appropriate in linking valence to the temporal dimension (see Figure 2).
Such an exponential function has some interesting properties. First, valence will be strong-

est for immediately attainable outcomes such
as those normally termed intrinsic. As the time
lag increases, the effect of each time increment
on valence is reduced. Thus, anticipated rewards
may have some motivating effect no matter how

distant their attainment. Typical deferred rewards of this nature are pensions, sabbatical
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pectancy and valence, but a function of expectancy and valence of outcomes discounted to the
point in time at which the act takes place. Present performance is a function of the discounted
valence of first level outcomes multiplied by the

expectancy that performance will eventually
lead to the outcome. Mathematically:

T n E2ij Vt, j

F fi (1 +dj)
t=O j=1
Where:

Fi = The motive force acting on an indidividual to perform activity i at
time t= O.

E 1, = The expectancy that effort exerted
will result in the performance of
activity i.
T = The total time frame over which first

level outcomes resulting from ac-

leaves, and the less materialistic salvation. Second, this model specifies a discount factor d that
determines the rate of valence reduction over

time. This discount rate may be different for
each outcome attainable. That is, some types of
outcomes may be more time sensitive than
others when determining outcome valence.
Whether or not this proposed exponential
relationship is indeed the true relationship between perceptions of outcome valence and the
time lag preceding outcome attainment is an
empirical issue. Similarly, the assumption that
different outcomes may show differential time

tivity i are expected to accrue. It is

assumed that time will be meas-

ured in discrete units such as days,
weeks, months, and years.

E 2 j = The expectancy that performance of
activity i will lead to outcome j independent of time.
Vt, = The undiscounted valence of out-

comej to be received at time t.

dj = The time based discount factor for
outcomej.

sensitivity lends itself to empirical verification.

t = The time elapsed since exertion of

The Time Discounted Expectancy Model

n = The number of first level outcomes

In view of the above considerations, the expectancy behavioral choice model should be
reformulated in terms of the time dimension.
Since outcomes of work behavior do not occur
at the same point in time, we must account for
the effect these time differences might have on
motivation. Specifically, it is hypothesized that
the force acting on an individual to perform an
act at a given time is not just a function of ex-

effort to accomplish activity i.

anticipated as a result of activity i.

The following assumptions are implict in this

formulation:

1. The primary effect of the effort-reward
time lag is on perceptions of valence.

2. Although time is a continuous variable,
it is treated as discrete in this model, in

accordance with the usual industrial

practice of administering rewards at dis-
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crete intervals such as weekly, or
monthly. Even though rewards may be
accrued continuously as in piece rate
systems, actual reward receipt occurs at

discrete time intervals.

3. The possibility exists that individuals assign a different time discount factor to
each first level outcome or class of out-

comes. This discount factor can be de-

by selected methodological findings. Heneman
and Schwab (2) report the test-retest reliability
for expectancy measures to be higher than for
valence measures. One explanation is that some
rewards were more immediately attainable at
the second administration of the questionnaire

than at the first. The valence measure would

change as a result of a shorter discount period at
the second administration. Other writers (5, 6)

rived empirically. The exponential rela- provide more direct support for a time distionship proposed is based on the no- counted model in their finding that (E x V) loses

tion that some outcomes, money for ex- predictive pwower with increase in the time lag

ample, can be invested to accrue addi-

between E and V measures and the measure of

effort or performance. The time-lag model
elastic perceptions individuals have re- would make such a prediction in that it assumes
present, not future behavior to be determined
garding units of time.
by (E x V). Valence measures repeatedly have
Empirical Support for VIE Reformulation
shown little variance, and combining valence
In addition to folk knowledge ("A bird inand expectancy does not improve on the use of
hand is worth two in the bush,"), there is some expectancy alone in predicting behavior. This
empirical support for the contention that as themay be due to employing questionnaire items
that measure valence of rewards as if they are
attainment of a reward becomes more immediattainable
in the present. Since organizations
ate the reward becomes more preferred. Mational similar outcomes and from the

honey (8) reported that managers prefer straight design incentive systems around highly attractive
rewards, each should be highly valent in the
salary as a reward to less immediately attainable

pensions, insurance, or vacations. In a recent

present. Adjustment of these valences measures
to account for the differential receipt of re-

study (3), money earned by subjects on the first
day of the study was not paid out until the last wards with respect to time should increase vari-

day. Researchers found an increase in perceived ance in these measures and perhaps the predicimportance of money as an outcome over the tive power of the model.
six day time frame of the experiment. This eleva-

tion of importance was independent of expectancy manipulations. Although the increase
could be due to subjects' compensation for the

Implications of the Time
Discounted Model

lack of intrinsic job value (1) or to an increase in

The primary distinction of this model is that
current behavior is a function of the discounted

that as the payoff date drew nearer, the valence

valence of the rewards expected as a conse-

basic needs related to money, it also is possible
of the reward increased as a function of time.

quence of that behavior and the expectancy that
Other researchers (13) have shown that during effort will eventually lead to these rewards. Unthe job choice process as employment drew like earlier formulations of the expectancy modnear, the valence of immediate and tangible el, this revision allows for the consideration that

outcomes increased. Although other explana- rewards may be received sequentially and furtions are plaucible, reward valence did increase thermore that the same class of reward may be

as time of receipt approached.

obtained at different time intervals. Bonuses

might be paid in increments to reduce an emThe incorporation of the time dimension
into the expectancy model is further supported ployee's tax liability, or one's share of a profit
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sharing fund might not be available for use until

some future date, even though the amount in
the fund depended upon current performance.
Thus, even though these incentives are based on
current performance, a pay raise (also a monetary incentive) immediately available might
carry more motive weight even if the absolute

amount of the raise were far less than the future

bonus payment.
Time may differentially affect the valence
assigned to different classes of incentives.
Awareness of this relationship could guide administration of incentive plans. An optimal mix
of incentives may be granted at specified time
intervals after task accomplishment to maximize
such factors as job satisfaction or productivity.
Intrinsic rewards received at time t=O would

requisite first step would be to insure that instruments used to measure valence be worded to

obtain present values/attractiveness of outcomes. Additional questionnaire items should

be included to determine over what time frame

receipt of outcomes is to take place. But even
with appropriate instruments, viewing behavior
as occurring immediately following motivational
antecedents presents an interesting research design problem. How can causal relationships between motivational factors and behavior be

demonstrated in field survey designs? The time
discounted model would require measurement
of a behavioral criterion immediately following
measurement of the motivationally based pre-

dictor. Traditional time lags of one to six months

between measurement of predictors and crite-

not be discounted at all whereas pay raises might
ria may be inappropriate for testing VIE based

not accrue until some future salary review had
hypotheses. Unfortunately, time lags of only a
taken place. The emphasis an organization
few minutes, or perhaps hours, may lead to explaces on various rewards should be tempered
treme subject reactivity to the research, thus reby time considerations.
quiring elaborate study designs to control for
Future research must be addressed to the

this effect.

temporal relationships among VIE variables. A
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reviewed. Greene and Craft state:

the evidence to-date clearly supports the conclusion that performance and satisfaction are
covariants of a third variable (or variables).
Particularly promising is the finding that rewards based on current performance signifi-

cantly affect subsequent performance (4, p.

191).
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satisfaction(-rewards) controversy has been
made by Greene and Craft (4) in a comprehensive article examining the three hypotheses indirectly involved in Organ's work: (a) satisfac-

tion causes performance; (b) performance
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their performance (3). As seen by Greene and
Craft, the problem for management is to address the problems of poorly directed workers,
lack of ability, and performance obstacles and
then institute a reward system that induces ef-

fort and, subsequently, performance.
1 Editor's Note: This is a response to Professor Dennis

W. Organ's article entitled: "A Reappraisal and Reinterpretation of the Satisfaction-Causes-Performance

Hypothesis," which appeared in the January, 1977 issue

of the Review.

